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This article was commissioned for the
PLoS Medicine series on Big Food that
examines the activities and influence of the
food and beverage industry in the health
arena.
As the PLoS Medicine series on Big Food
(www.ploscollections.org/bigfood) kicks
off, let’s begin this Essay with a blunt
conclusion: Global food systems are not
meeting the world’s dietary needs [1].
About one billion people are hungry, while
two billion people are overweight [2].
India, for example, is experiencing rises in
both: since 1995 an additional 65 million
people are malnourished, and one in five
adults is now overweight [3,4]. This
coexistence of food insecurity and obesity
may seem like a paradox [5], but over-
and undernutrition reflect two facets of
malnutrition [6]. Underlying both is a
common factor: food systems are not
driven to deliver optimal human diets
but to maximize profits. For people living
in poverty, this means either exclusion
from development (and consequent food
insecurity) or eating low-cost, highly pro-
cessed foods lacking in nutrition and rich
in sugar, salt, and saturated fats (and
consequent overweight and obesity).
To understand who is responsible for
these nutritional failures, it is first necessary
to ask: Who rules global food systems? By and
large it’s ‘‘Big Food,’’ by which we refer to
multinational food and beverage companies
with huge and concentrated market power
[7,8]. In the United States, the ten largest
food companies control over half of all food
sales [9] and worldwide this proportion is
about 15% and rising. More than half of
global soft drinks are produced by large
multinational companies, mainly Coca-
Cola and PepsiCo [10]. Three-fourths of
world food sales involve processed foods, for
which the largest manufacturers hold over a
third of the global market [11]. The world’s
food system is not a competitive market-
place of small producers but an oligopoly.
What people eat is increasingly driven by a
few multinational food companies [12].
Virtually all growth in Big Food’s sales
occurs in developing countries [13] (see
Figure 1). The saturation of markets in
developed countries [14], along with the
lure of the 20% of income people spend on
average on food globally, has stimulated
Big Food to seek global expansion. Its rapid
entry into markets in low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs) is a result of
mass-marketing campaigns and foreign
investment, principally through takeovers
of domestic food companies [15]. Trade
plays a minimal role and accounts for only
about 6% of global processed food sales
[15]. Global producers are the main reason
why the ‘‘nutrition transition’’ from tradi-
tional, simple diets to highly processed
foods is accelerating [16,17].
Big Food is a driving force behind the
global rise in consumption of sugar-
sweetened beverages (SSBs) and processed
foods enriched in salt, sugar, and fat [13].
Increasing consumption of Big Food’s
products tracks closely with rising levels
of obesity and diabetes [18]. Evidence
shows that SSBs are major contributors to
childhood obesity [19,20], as well as to
long-term weight-gain, type 2 diabetes,
and cardiovascular disease [21,22]. Stud-
ies also link frequent consumption of
highly processed foods with weight gain
and associated diseases [23].
Of course, Big Food may also bring
benefits—improved economic perfor-
mance through increased technology and
know-how and reduced risks of undernu-
trition—to local partners [24]. The extent
of these benefits is debatable, however, in
view of negative effects on farmers and on
domestic producers and food prices [25].
Public Health Response to Big
Food: A Failure to Act
Public health professionals have been
slow to respond to such nutritional threats
in developed countries and even slower
still in developing countries. Thanks to
insights from tobacco company docu-
ments, we have learned a great deal about
how this industry sought to avoid or flout
public health interventions that might
threaten their profits. We now have
considerable evidence that food and bev-
erage companies use similar tactics to
undermine public health responses such
as taxation and regulation [26,27,28,29],
an unsurprising observation given the
flows of people, funds, and activities
between Big Tobacco and Big Food. Yet
the public health response to Big Food has
been minimal.
We can think of multiple reasons for the
failure to act [30]. One is the belated
recognition of the importance of obesity to
the burden of disease in LMICs [13]. The
2011 Political Declaration of the United
Nations High-Level Meeting on Prevention
and Control of Non-communicable Diseas-
es (NCDs) recognized the urgent case for
addressing the major avoidable causes of
death and disability [31], but did not even
mention the roles of agribusiness and
processed foods in obesity. Despite evi-
dence to the contrary, some development
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‘‘disease of affluence’’ and a sign of progress
in combating undernutrition [32].
A more uncomfortable reason is that
action requires tackling vested interests,
especially the powerful Big Food compa-
nies with strong ties to and influence over
national governments. This is difficult
terrain for many public health scientists.
It took five decades after the initial studies
linking tobacco and cancer for effective
public health policies to be put in place,
with enormous cost to human health.
Must we wait five decades to respond to
the similar effects of Big Food?
If we are going to get serious about such
nutritional issues, we must make choices
about how to engage with Big Food.
Whether, and under what circumstances,
we should view food companies as ‘‘part-
ners’’ or as part of the solution to rising
rates of obesity and associated chronic
diseases is a matter of much current
debate, as indicated by the diverse views
of officials of PepsiCo and nutrition
scientists [24,27,28,33,34].
Engaging with Big Food—Three
Views
We see three possible ways to view this
debate. The first favors voluntary self-
regulation, and requires no further engage-
ment by the public health community.
Those who share this view argue that
market forces will self-correct the negative
externalities resulting from higher intake of
risky commodities. Informed individuals,
they say, will choose whether to eat
unhealthy foods and need not be subjected
to public health paternalism. On this basis,
UN secretary-general Ban Ki Moon urged
industry to be more responsible: ‘‘I espe-
cially call on corporations that profit from
selling processed foods to children to act
with the utmost integrity. I refer not only to
food manufacturers, but also the media,
marketing and advertising companies that
play central roles in these enterprises’’ [35].
Similarly, the UK Health Minister recently
said: ‘‘the food and drinks industry should
be seen, not just as part of the problem, but
part of the solution…An emphasis on
prevention, physical activity and personal
and corporate responsibility could, along-
side unifiedGovernment action,make a big
difference’’ [36].
The second view favors partnerships with
industry. Public health advocates who hold
this view may take jobs with industry in
order to make positive changes from within,
or actively seek partnerships and alliances
with food companies. Food, they say, is not
tobacco. Whereas tobacco is demonstrably
harmful in all forms and levels of consump-
tion, food is not. We can live without
tobacco, but we all must eat. Therefore, this
view holds that wemustworkwith BigFood
to make healthier products and market
them more responsibly.
The third approach is critical of both. It
recognizes the inherent conflicts of interest
between corporations that profit from
unhealthy food and public health collab-
orations. Because growth in profit is the
primary goal of corporations, self-regula-
tion and working from within are doomed
to fail. Most proponents of this viewpoint
support public regulation as the only
meaningful approach, although some pro-
pose having public health expert commit-
tees set standards and monitor industry
performance in improving the nutritional
quality of food products and in marketing
the products to children.
We support the critical view, for several
reasons. First, we find no evidence for an
alignment of public health interest in
curbing obesity with that of the food
and beverage industry. Any partnership
must create profit for the industry, which
has a legal mandate to maximize wealth
for shareholders. We also see no obvious,
established, or legitimate mechanism
through which public health professionals
might increase Big Food’s profits.
Big Food attains profit by expanding
markets to reach more people, increasing
people’s sense of hunger so that they buy
more food, and increasing profit margins
through encouraging consumption of
products with higher price/cost surpluses
[28–31,37]. Industry achieves these goals
through food processing and marketing,
and we are aware of no evidence for
health gains through partnerships in either
domain. Although in theory minimal
processing of foods can improve nutrition-
al content, in practice most processing is
done so to increase palatability, shelf-life,
and transportability, processes that reduce
nutritional quality. Processed foods are not
necessary for survival, and few individuals
are sufficiently well-informed or even
capable of overcoming marketing and cost
hurdles [38]. Big Food companies have
the resources to recruit leading nutritional
scientists and experts to guide product
development and reformulation, leaving
the role of public health advisors uncer-
tain.
To promote health, industry would
need to make and market healthier foods
so as to shift consumption away from
highly processed, unhealthy foods. Yet,
such healthier foods are inherently less
profitable. The only ways the industry
could preserve profit is either to under-
mine public health attempts to tax and
regulate or to get people to eat more
healthy food while continuing to eat
profitable unhealthy foods [33,39]. Nei-
ther is desirable from a nutritional
standpoint. Whereas industry support
for research might be seen as one place
to align interests, studies funded by
industry are 4- to 8-fold more likely to
support conclusions favorable to the
industry [40].
Our second reason to support the
critical view has to do with the ‘‘precau-
tionary principle’’ [41]. Because it is
unclear whether inherent conflicts of
interest can be reconciled, we favor
proceeding on the basis of evidence. As
George Orwell put it, ‘‘saints should always
be judged guilty until they are proved
innocent.’’ We believe the onus of proof is
on the food industry. If food companies
can rigorously and independently establish
self-regulation or private–public partner-
ships as improving both health and profit,
these methods should be extended and
replicated. But to date self-regulation has
largely failed to meet stated objectives
Figure 1. Growth of Big Food and Big
Tobacco sales in developing countries:
An example. Shaded blue line is developed
countries, dashed grey line is developing
countries. Source: Passport Global Market
Information Database: EuroMonitor Interna-
tional, 2011 [12].
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001242.g001
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sulted in significant pressure for public
regulation. Kraft’s decision to ban trans
fats, for example, occurred under pressure
of lawsuits [48]. If industry believed that
self-regulation would increase profit, it
would already be regulating itself.
We believe the critical view has much to
offer. It is a model of dynamic and
dialectic engagement. It will increase
pressures on industry to improve health
performance, and it will encourage those
who are sympathetic to the first or second
views to effect change from within large
food and beverage companies.
Public health professionals must recog-
nize that Big Food’s influence on global
food systems is a problem, and do what is
needed to reach a consensus about how to
engage critically. The Conflicts of Interest
Coalition, which emerged from concerns
about Big Food’s influence on the U.N.
High-Level Meeting on NCDs, is a good
place to start [29,49]. Public health profes-
sionals must place as high a priority on
nutrition as they do on HIV, infectious
diseases, and other disease threats. They
shouldsupportinitiativessuchasrestrictions
on marketing to children, better nutrition
standards for school meals, and taxes on
SSBs. The central aimof public health must
be to bring into alignment Big Food’s profit
motives with public health goals. Without
taking direct andconcerted action toexpose
and regulate the vested interests of Big
Food, epidemics of poverty, hunger, and
obesity are likely to become more acute.
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